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‘We don’t have a strategy’, President Obama responded when 
asked about US policy towards ISIS in 2014.1 A week later he 
came back with a ‘game plan’. In her memoirs Hillary Clinton 
argued that ‘great nations need an organising principle’ (Clin-
ton, 2014).  She added that Obama’s foreign policy slogan 
‘don’t do stupid stuff’ was not a good example of one. There 
seems to be some confusion in Western thinking about what 
a strategy actually is, and there is more than a suspicion that 
when it comes to strategic thinking, some countries, notably 
Russia and China, do it better than the West.
Initially one should begin by asking what a strategy is.  It is 
not politics; it is not policy, and it is not diplomacy.  It may 
exist in relation to all three but it does not replace them.  It 
is what should give direction to policy and diplomacy.  How-
ever, despite how conceptually good a strategy may be, if 
diplomats are not up to implementing it and the policymak-
ers do not grasp it, then it is in trouble.  This is an especially 
acute problem when in government different agencies and 
departments do not always follow the agreed line.  This is 
even more of a problem when it comes to pluralistic alliances 
in which there may be no agreed consensus, and often con-
flicting interests and agendas.
So in crafting a response to the changing strategic environ-
ment in which the West finds itself, the principal interest 
must be grasping the main tenets of strategic thinking.  Here 
are seven that NATO would do well to consider if it ever 
decides to come up with a new strategic concept, one to 
replace its last in 2010.
 
Tenet 1: Every political strategy should be adaptable 
In his Reith Lectures War and Our World, John Keegan wrote: 
‘War is a protean activity …like disease it exhibits the capac-
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1 ‘Obama on ISIS in Syria: “We don’t have a strategy yet”’, CNN, 4 September 
2014: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/28/world/meast/isis-iraq-syria/  
ity to mutate and it mutates fastest in the face of efforts to 
control or eliminate it’ (Keegan, 1998).  Every strategy must 
be based on adaptability because of the tendency of war to 
evolve.  The two examples that confront the Alliance at the 
moment are hybrid warfare by Russia and the use of social 
media by ISIS.
With containment NATO developed a sophisticated and 
compelling strategy for dealing with the USSR.  It was easy, 
you might say, because nuclear weapons ‘froze’ the conflict 
between West and East. Deterrence was never going to be 
put to the test. We should remind ourselves that NATO in 
the Cold War years always had to consider the prospect of 
hybrid warfare.  The concept is not new.  The 1957 Strategic 
Concept which introduced the doctrine of massive retaliation 
warned of ‘hostile local actions’ that might catch the Alliance 
off-guard and paralyse its decision-making.  When NATO 
adopted the forward defence strategy in the early 1960s, 
special attention was paid to one city, Kassel (located on the 
Fulda River in Northern Hesse) for fear the Russians might 
seize it and then bargain it away for the Western zone in Ber-
lin.  Indeed, NATO put together the Allied Mobile Force partly 
to respond to any attempts to seize territory in Denmark or 
Norway after a prolonged period of subversion and political 
propaganda that might have undermined the political cohe-
sion of the Alliance.
So adaptability has to be built in.  As General Eisenhower, 
NATO’s first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) 
famously remarked, ‘strategy is useless, but strategic plan-
ning is indispensable’. Good strategic planning allows one to 
build resilience into strategic concepts.  Of course, resilience 
means different things to different people.  For engineers it is 
the degree to which a structure can return to its baseline state 
after being tested, such as a bridge in a storm.  For psycholo-
gists it is about the ability to deal with trauma.  For business-
men it is putting in place back-ups of data and research to 
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ensure continuous operation.  But here is one excellent defi-
nition: ‘It’s the capacity of any enterprise to maintain its core 
purpose and integrity in the face of dramatically changed 
circumstances’ (Zolli & Healey, 2012).  The core purpose of 
NATO remains deterrence (in the case of Russia) and contain-
ment (in the case of ISIS).
Tenet 2: Strategy is about power
‘Strategy … is the central political art.  It is about getting more 
out of a situation … it’s the art of creating power’ (Freedman, 
2013).  Power – and power alone – allows one to deter an 
enemy and to engage with it at the same time.  This was the 
supreme insight of the Harmel Commission in 1967 which 
provided the underlying consensus that kept the Alliance on 
the road for the next 30 years.  Deterrence and détente: both 
were based on power - the power to harm and reward.  We 
have tended to lose sight of this recently because of two criti-
cal misunderstandings.
We have tended to over-estimate our power by setting 
ourselves what Richard Rumelt calls ‘blue-sky objectives’ 
(Rumelt, 2011).  According to the Economist, Rumelt is one 
of the world’s leading strategic thinkers. He is also a business 
strategist who was consulted in 2006 to help draft the Quad-
rennial Defense Review.  Rumelt is scathing of the tendency of 
the United States to define strategic ambitions (for example, 
the export of democracy) when there is no understanding of 
how it is to be achieved, and at what cost.  In an interview 
he gave with The Wall Street Journal in January, the former 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates cited another blue-sky objec-
tive: The West’s insistence that Assad must go. About the 
objective Gates added ‘I don’t think presidents should commit 
to things that they have no idea how to make happen’.2
Secondly, we have tended to under-estimate our power.  We 
have tended to lose sight of the traditional currency of mili-
tary power with the wholesale slashing of defence budgets 
in the last 10 years, whilst Russia has increased its budget 
by 230%.  To be sure, there is nothing wrong in identifying 
soft power in the game of international relations, but soft 
power is precisely that.  Last year’s Soft Power Index named 
ten top countries in the world – all but one (Japan) – were 
Western.3  That is a power relationship: it is not an alternative 
to power.  And of course the problem of disposing of so much 
soft power is that the West has highlighted its absence in the 
non-Western world.  The upshot is obvious.
Tenet 3: In crafting any strategy, we must understand 
the other side’s strategy
‘The first, the supreme, most far-reaching act of judgement 
that the Statesman and Commander have to make is to estab-
lish the kind of war on which they are embarking … This is 
the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehen-
sive’ (Clausewitz in Howard & Paret, 1976).
In crafting any strategy, we must understand the other side’s. 
The problem in dealing with a concept such as hybrid war is to 
decide exactly what it is intended to achieve.  Is it war?  Are we 
actually at war with Russia?  Is it largely a political tactic?  Is 
the methodology a way of understanding conflict that is quin-
tessentially Russian and/or Soviet?  Putin’s mentality is often 
considered to be post-Soviet. Or is it merely the traditional 
Russian wish to be noticed?  Remember the Russian proverb: 
‘If you’re not sitting at the top table, you may find yourself on 
the menu’. Depending on what you think hybrid warfare is try-
ing to achieve, you should craft a strategy accordingly.
Why is hybrid warfare attractive to Russia?  ‘It’s more evo-
lutionary than revolutionary … it reflects more continuity 
than change’ (Adamsky, 2015).  This is one interpretation. 
It exploits local conditions: the ethnic heterogeneity of the 
Near Abroad (the Russian minorities in the Baltic States); the 
weakness of civil society in the region, and latent historical 
grievances.  None of these of themselves mean conflict is 
inevitable, but they offer opportunities for Russia to increase 
its influence. If Russian moves are indeed opportunistic, 
intimidatory or intended to produce ‘frozen conflicts’, then 
the primary strategic purpose of NATO must be to prevent 
those opportunities from arising in the first place.  By con-
trast, the use of hybrid warfare by ISIS can be considered rev-
olutionary, and intended to subvert the entire state-system 
in the Middle East. The best way in the case of Russia is to 
not allow oneself to be intimidated by building up counter-
veiling strengths, both nuclear and conventional.  The best 
way of dealing with ISIS may be putting boots on the ground.
Tenet 4: Strategy involves a narrative
Every strategy involves storytelling and it is only as compel-
ling as the story is believable. During the Cold War we told 
ourselves that the internal contradictions of the Soviet system 
would lead eventually to its collapse. The Soviets, for their 
part, told themselves much the same story about us: the inter-
nal contradictions of capitalism would prove our ultimate 
undoing. In short, there was no reason to precipitate a war. 
But what story do we tell ourselves about ISIS?  We probably 
face a protracted period of turbulence in the Middle East.  We 
do not know what the internal contradictions of Middle East 
politics actually are.  We do not know who is on the right side 
of history in the Middle East: Iran or Saudi Arabia; Islamism 
or non-religious politics, authoritarian rule or democracy?  As 
a result, it is very difficult to craft a convincing story.  And in 
the absence of such a story we lack self-belief: the self-belief 
to commit ourselves to using force if and when appropriate.
Tenet 5: Every strategy involves a paradigm
A paradigm is a way of looking at the world.  Sometimes a 
paradigm shift can be dramatic. 
The three Strategic Concepts that NATO adapted after the end 
of Cold War, respectively in 1991, 1999, and 2010, were all 
about collective security.  And what characterised them all 
was a new security concept: risk management.
2 ‘The U.S. has no global strategy’, Wall Street Journal, 29 January 2016: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-has-no-global-strategy-1454108567
3 ‘Power: Softly Does It’, The Economist Print Edition, July 2015: http://
www.economist.com/news/britain/21657655-oxbridge-one-direction-
and-premier-league-bolster-britains-power-persuade-softly-does-it
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Every president, for example, who took his country to war since 
Woodrow Wilson in 1917, promised a New World Order. George 
W. Bush did not: After 9/11 he told the American people that 
they were likely to live for the foreseeable future in a ‘global 
disorder’ that bred terrorism and gave it a global reach. Bush’s 
job was to manage it: to produce not security, but an acceptable 
level of insecurity. Or as the 2016 German Marshall Fund report 
describes it: ‘durable chaos’ (Baranowski & Lété, 2016). 
Secondly, in the Cold War we defended ourselves against 
threats that were predictable and measurable.  We were able 
to measure the capabilities of the enemy with a fair degree of 
accuracy, and to ascertain its intentions with a fair degree of 
confidence.  After 1991 we had to secure ourselves against risks 
that were by their nature unpredictable and unmeasurable.
Thirdly, in the Cold War we deterred states from attacking us, 
or in the case of North Korea and North Vietnam, we engaged 
them in battle. After 1991 we had to deal with non-state 
actors and social/economic factors from migration to global 
pandemics such as SARS.
In the case of terrorism, which came to the top of the list, we 
came up with metrics: were we tackling its root causes; were 
we winning hearts and minds; were we encouraging terrorists 
to defect; were we dissuading states in supporting terrorist 
movements; were we dissuading people from joining terror-
ist groups; were we cutting off funds and preventing money 
laundering; and how many terrorists were we actually killing? 
Significantly, the body counts or ‘capture or kill kinetics’ were 
not considered the most important metric, even by hard-core 
neo-conservatives like Donald Rumsfeld.  
The risk management model worked up to a point. The problem 
was that NATO kept piling on the risks from cyber-terrorism to 
piracy, which appeared for the first time in the 2010 Strategic 
Concept.  The failure to prioritise was inevitable by virtue of the 
exercise itself. Risks are inherently subjective. If you are Italy, 
you will be most concerned about migration; if you are the UK 
you may consider the Global War on Terror to be the main pri-
ority.  If you are Norway, you are most likely to be concerned 
about Russian activities and objectives in the High North.
Since 2004 we have gone back to collective defence against 
both Russia and ISIS. In fact, the Alliance now seems to be 
applying two different paradigms at the same time: Threat 
management against clear or present danger; and risk man-
agement in the case of migration, referring to the 1,000,000 
migrants who entered Europe in 2015.
Interestingly, the rest of the world is still in the risk manage-
ment business. Take this year’s Davos World Economic Forum 
Global Risks Report. The strategy is simple but radical at the 
same time.  It is networked and focused on impact. What is the 
most immediate problem? Migration. What produces it? Politi-
cal instability, especially in Syria where 450, 000 people have 
died. What produced instability in Syria? A four-year drought. 
In other words, the Syrian Revolution is at least in part the 
outcome of climate change. The idea is to target the problem 
that has the greatest impact: environmental damage. This 
has a seductive simplicity. Sure, we face a variety of environ-
mental threats, including carbon emissions, floods, droughts, 
sea-level rises and collapsing ice sheets. But they are all symp-
toms of one problem: burning fossil fuels. And they all have an 
impact because they are globally networked.
Could NATO come up with something so deceptively simple? 
It has tried to network risk management with Partnership for 
Peace countries, but it has not taken the exercise as far as it 
might.  Or is the Davos strategy politically impractical for an 
Alliance such as NATO?
Tenet Six: Strategy is simple
‘Everything in war is simple, but the simple is increasingly 
difficult’.
Those familiar with Clausewitz’ writings will recognise that I 
have slipped in the word ‘increasingly’ into the quote.  Com-
plexity has become the prism through which we interrogate 
ourselves and the complexity of the world creates one outstand-
ing problem: we may be the greatest risk to ourselves. ‘Uncer-
tainty is not merely an existing environmental condition; it’s a 
natural by-product of war’(United States Marine Corps, 1996). 
The term of art is consequence management. This is at the 
core of the US Marine Corps Doctrine. Once you commit forces, 
everything changes. Because others will react to it no strategy, 
when implemented, is without consequences.
After all, the Russians like to claim that we invented hybrid 
warfare.  They cite our attempt to ‘destabilise’ the neighbour-
hood through the Orange Revolution and Maidan Protests in 
Ukraine.  They cite our propaganda attempts via social media 
and the internet to subvert the Russian state and attempt 
regime change.  This was certainly not an intention or policy, 
but if it had been, we would be reaping what we have sown.
Sometimes we can indeed be our own worst enemy.  In craft-
ing any strategy, we therefore face what sociologists call the 
‘risk trap’. A good example is the West’s strategy towards 
Iran. Doing too much (bombing nuclear installations); 
or doing too little (no sanctions) would both have been 
harmful. Allowing Iran to get the bomb or preventing it by 
military force could both have been dangerous: the former 
in the long term, the latter in the short.  Our intention was 
always to steer a middle course. Obama’s policy in Iran may 
be considered by historians to be the greatest success story 
of the administration, or it may not. Only historians will be 
in a position to tell us. It could be argued, nonetheless, that 
the penalties on Iran worked, especially the threats to Russia 
that were made behind the scenes for breaking the sanctions 
regime. The deal with Iran is not optimal, but it is probably 
the best that we could have got in the circumstances.
Tenet 7: Always plan for surprise
The final strategic tenet is this: always prepare for ‘black 
swans’.  The man who introduced us to the idea, Nasim Taleb, 
reminds us that black swan events are large, improbable and 
highly consequential. An example is the rise of the internet or 
the outbreak of the First World War.  And by definition they are 
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America’s top prediction experts, Philip Tetlock.  ‘Knowing what 
we don’t know is better than thinking we know what we don’t’ 
(Tetlock & Gardner, 2015).
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unpredictable.  In today’s world they are also increasing all 
the time.  The solution, he tells us is to make our institutions 
and policies not merely less vulnerable to the unexpected, but 
actively ‘anti-fragile’ – poised to benefit or take advantage from 
stress or change. It is not clear how this can be done, and Taleb 
does not exactly spell out how best to proceed.  But one lesson 
from recent history is obvious: do not box yourself in by trying 
to eliminate surprise.
An example is Tony Blair. Just before coming to office he declared: 
‘Mine is the first generation able to contemplate the possibility 
that we may live our entire lives without going to war or sending 
our children to war’ (Blair, 1997). In the end, he fought five, mak-
ing Blair’s Wars the title of a book (Kampfner, 2003). Two years 
later – 22 days into the Kosovo War – he argued that the dark 
side of globalisation had thrown up new strategic challenges 
that required military intervention.  It was the popular theme 
of the time.  Wes Clark, NATO’s SACEUR, talked of the Alliance 
being a ‘facilitator of globalisation’; the EU’s first and so far only 
comprehensive strategy referred to the EU as being a ‘facilitator 
of global civil society’. Then came 9/11 and the Global War on 
Terror.  On leaving office in 2007, Blair went so far as to say that 
the only purpose of the Royal Navy was to maintain a permanent 
British military presence in north-west Asia.
What this illustrates is how a sophisticated, intelligent and very 
successful politician kept getting it wrong because he ruled out 
surprise.  ISIS may have peaked. The oil price may yet force Rus-
sia out of Eastern Ukraine. Something else may appear on the 
radar quite soon. Keep always in the forefront of one’s mind this 
final lesson.  Judgements are unavoidable and choices have to be 
made. We have to plan on the basis of trend analysis, but we have 
no way of knowing the end of a trend line, or its trajectory, or 
whether we should be looking at counter-trends. The lesson to 
be learned is to be found in a book Super Forecasting by one of 
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